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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3660 
___________ 
 
CHRIS WASHINGTON-EL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Sued in his 
individual and official capacity; GEORGE PATRICK; RANDALL BRITTON; DEPUTY 
SUPT. CLOSE; F. HARNETT; BRIAN COLEMAN; DEPUTY SUPT. BURNS; 
DEPUTY SUPT. GATES; MICHAEL ZAKEN; ERIC ARMEL; CAPTAIN LEGGETT; 
SHERWOOD HUGHES; STEPHEN BUZAS; FRANK LEWIS,  
in their individual capacities 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-01688) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and  
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 13, 2014 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: March 20, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
2 
 
 Chris Washington-El appeals pro se from an order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, entering judgment in favor of the 
defendants in his civil rights action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 In December 2008, Washington-El filed a complaint, which he amended several 
times, against numerous Department of Corrections (“DOC”) officials and employees.  
His allegations can generally be divided into two categories:  (1) due process claims 
related to his initial placement and continued confinement in administrative custody, and 
(2) constitutional challenges to the conditions of his confinement.  The violations 
allegedly occurred while Washington-El was incarcerated at SCI-Houtzdale (June 2007 
through February 2008) and SCI-Fayette (February 2008 through November 2009).  
Following a Magistrate Judge’s entry of Reports and Recommendations, the District 
Court – in three separate orders – granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and their 
motion for summary judgment.  After the District Court denied Washington-El’s motion 
for reconsideration, he appealed.    
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
  “We review district court 
decisions regarding both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim 
                                              
1
 The District Court rejected Washington-El’s last remaining claims by final order and 
judgment entered on March 28, 2013.  Washington-El filed a timely motion for 
reconsideration on April 10, 2013, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), thereby tolling the time for 
filing an appeal.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).  The District Court denied 
reconsideration on July 12, 2013.  Washington-El submitted his notice of appeal to prison 
officials for mailing 27 days later, on August 8, 2013.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); 
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under the same de novo standard of review.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 
822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).  
Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 
2006).  We review the District Court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration for abuse 
of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel.  Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 On June 13, 2007, Washington-El was transferred from SCI-Graterford to SCI-
Houtzdale, where, for the majority of his eight-month incarceration there, he was held in 
administrative custody.
2
  He was placed on the Restricted Release List (“RRL”) in 
                                                                                                                                                  
4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).  Therefore, the notice of appeal was 
timely as to both the denial of reconsideration and the order granting summary judgment.  
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).  Moreover, we now also have jurisdiction to review 
the District Court’s prior orders granting in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss.  See 
Head v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Tr., 225 F.3d 794, 800 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
ruling on motion to dismiss which did not dispose of all claims was rendered appealable 
when District Court later entered summary judgment resolving all outstanding claims).   
 
2
 With respect to Washington-El’s claim that his initial placement in administrative 
custody at SCI-Houtzdale violated his due process rights, the District Court properly held 
that he lacked a protected interest in such placement.  See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 
78, 88 n.9 (1976) (explaining that prisoners have no legitimate due process concerns in 
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January 2008, signifying that he could be released from administrative custody only upon 
prior approval of the Secretary of Corrections.  In February 2008, Washington-El was 
transferred to SCI-Fayette, where his placement in administrative custody and inclusion 
on the RRL continued.  In total, Washington-El was in administrative custody and/or 
included on the RRL during approximately 26 of the 28 months he was incarcerated in 
SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette.   
 Washington-El alleged that his continued administrative custody and RRL 
classifications violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Assuming that the circumstances of his incarceration are sufficient to 
trigger procedural due process rights, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), 
Washington-El has failed to demonstrate that he was not afforded proper due process 
protections.  We have held that periodic review of inmates indefinitely confined to 
administrative custody meets due process requirements.  Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 
147 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, Washington-El was timely informed that he was placed in 
administrative custody and included on the RRL because he was considered an escape 
risk.  In addition, his numerous challenges to his custody status, both formal and 
informal, were regularly reviewed by members of the Program Review Committee 
(“PRC”) at SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette.  See id. at 144 (holding that a prisoner who 
                                                                                                                                                  
their prison classifications).  We also note that a challenge to Washington-El’s placement 
in administrative custody at SCI-Graterford, as well as other claims, is the subject of a 
separate action filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  See Washington-El v. 
DiGuglielmo, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 06-cv-04517. 
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was placed in administrative custody for eight years was afforded all the process he was 
due because “an ‘informal, nonadversary review’ at which the prisoner has the 
opportunity to state his views, satisfies the requirements of due process” (quoting Hewitt 
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983))).  Moreover, the summary judgment record belies 
Washington-El’s assertion that the periodic reviews were perfunctory, and thus 
inadequate.  See Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that 
due process violation occurred where prison officials applied justifications for 
segregation in “rote fashion”).  During those reviews, prison officials considered the 
status of an investigation concerning a possible escape plan involving Washington-El, 
reviewed the results of that investigation, assessed whether to recommend Washington-El 
for release to the general population, and responded to his arguments for release from 
administrative custody.  Finally, it is difficult to conclude that review was not meaningful 
where, following Washington-El’s contention that the investigation was being 
intentionally delayed, he was released from administrative custody for approximately two 
months.   
 We also agree with the District Court that Washington-El failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies with respect to his remaining claims, all of which concern his 
conditions of confinement, rather than his continued placement in administrative custody.  
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), inmates must exhaust their 
administrative remedies before filing a suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional 
conduct by prison officials.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).   A prisoner must exhaust these 
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remedies “in the literal sense”; no further avenues in the prison’s grievance process 
should be available.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).  “[I]t is the 
prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper 
exhaustion.”   Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).  The DOC has an Inmate 
Grievance System, which permits inmates to seek review of issues relating to their 
confinement, see DC-ADM 804, and a separate policy regarding Administrative Custody 
Procedures, which allows inmates to challenge initial and continued administrative 
custody placement, see DC-ADM 802.   
 An affidavit prepared by the DOC custodian of inmate grievance records indicated 
that, while confined at SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette, Washington-El appealed to final 
review eight grievances brought under DC-ADM 804.  After thoroughly reviewing the 
record, we agree with the District Court that none of those grievances pertained to the 
conditions of confinement claims that he raised in the this lawsuit.  Washington-El 
argued, however, that his remaining claims were administratively exhausted through 
grievances that he filed pursuant to DC-ADM 802.  Importantly, however, the regulatory 
scheme that was in effect during the relevant time period provided that DC-ADM 802 
governed challenges only to initial or continued confinement in administrative custody; 
DC-ADM 804 remained applicable to challenges unrelated to custody status.
3
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 DOC regulations provided “access to a formal procedure through which the resolution 
of problems or other issues of concern arising during the course of confinement may be 
sought.”  DC-ADM 804 § V (2004).  But this general provision was subject to an 
exception which stated that “[i]nitial review of issues relating to the following 
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Washington-El also claimed that DOC officials advised him that he could not use DC-
ADM 804 to grieve issues related to the conditions of his confinement in administrative 
custody.  But such advice allegedly occurred in January 2011, after Washington-El had 
been transferred from SCI-Houtzdale and SCI-Fayette.  Furthermore, while confined in 
those facilities, Washington-El did use DC-ADM 804 to challenge conditions of his 
administrative custody, other than those raised in his complaints.   
 Under these circumstances, we conclude that Washington-El failed to state a due 
process claim concerning his continued confinement in administrative custody and failed 
to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his conditions of confinement claims.  In 
addition, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of the motion for 
reconsideration, as Washington-El’s arguments did not serve “to correct manifest errors 
of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”  Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 
                                                                                                                                                  
Department policies shall be in accordance with procedures outlines therein[:] . . . DC-
ADM 802, Administrative Custody Procedures.”  DC-ADM 804 § IV, ¶ H.  The 
regulations pertaining to administrative custody, in turn, provided that “[a]n inmate may 
appeal the decision of the PRC concerning his/her initial confinement in [administrative 
custody] to the Facility Manager/designee” and thereafter “may appeal the . . . decision 
. . . to continue him/her in [administrative custody] . . . to the Office of the Chief Hearing 
Examiner.”  DC-ADM 802 § 2, ¶¶ C.1 and C.2 (2008).  In 2011, after the relevant time 
period in this case, DC-ADM 802 was amended to provide that “[a]ll issues concerning 
an inmate’s placement in [administrative] custody or the duration, conditions or other 
circumstances of his/her [administrative custody] status must be addressed through the 
procedures set for in this directive and may not be addressed through the procedures set 
forth in DC-ADM 801 [pertaining to disciplinary proceedings] or DC-ADM 804.”  DC-
ADM 802 § 2, ¶ D.9 (emphasis added). 
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F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985).  Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.
4
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 Washington El’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied. 
